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Police Sexual Violence: Police Brutality, 
#MeToo, and Masculinities 
Dara E. Purvis* and Melissa Blanco** 
A woman alleges that she was raped by a police officer while in 
police custody. The police officer acknowledges that he had sexual 
intercourse with the woman but argues that she consented to the 
interaction. Despite the clear power imbalance and troubling context 
of the sexual activity, in a majority of U.S. states, if the police officer 
convinces even one member of a jury that their activity was 
consensual, then the officer cannot be convicted. Consent is a defense 
to allegations of sexual assault—even when the alleged assault occurs 
while the victim is in the custody of the perpetrator. 
Allegations that police officers have committed sexual assault 
while on duty are shockingly prevalent and surprisingly 
underanalyzed. Police sexual violence (PSV) is situated at the 
intersection of two vital national conversations about police brutality 
and sexual violence and harassment. This Article addresses PSV as the 
product of both issues and recommends systemic solutions sounding in 
both debates. 
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The immediate problem PSV presents is that it is not made clearly 
illegal by state law and police department regulation. The deeper 
problem is that PSV is a symptom of broader cultural problems within 
police departments that can be helpfully parsed through the lens of 
masculinities theories. PSV springs from issues both with how police 
officers relate to the communities they patrol, especially men in those 
communities, and with how police officers and police culture treat 
women. The famous “blue wall of silence,” ensuring loyalty even 
among police officers who commit misconduct, magnifies these issues. 
Any attempt to meaningfully address PSV must take all of these factors 
into account to work both a legal and a cultural change. This Article 
offers such solutions, addressing substantive and procedural 
prohibitions of PSV and broader cultural changes to police 
departments to combat PSV at its roots. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2017, two New York City police officers, Eddie Martins and 
Richard Hall, were charged with kidnapping and raping Anna Chambers,1 an 
eighteen-year-old woman whom the officers had taken into custody.2 Chambers 
was sitting in a parked car around 7:30 to 8:00 at night with two male friends 
when the two police officers pulled up in a van.3 The two police officers flashed 
their badges as they approached Chambers and her two friends.4 The police 
officers handcuffed Chambers, but told her friends that they were “free to go.”5 
Chambers recounted that the police officers took her into the van and each raped 
her while she was handcuffed and crying.6 About an hour later, the police officers 
dropped Chambers off near the area where they picked her up.7 Shortly after, 
Chambers and her mother went to a hospital where a nurse conducted a rape kit.8 
The rape kit matched Martins’s and Hall’s DNA.9 
In January 2016, former Oklahoma City police officer Daniel Holtzclaw 
was sentenced to 263 years in prison for raping and assaulting eight women of 
color who reported that Holtzclaw sexually assaulted them between December 
2013 and June 2014.10 Another five women also reported similar assaults for 
which Holtzclaw was not convicted.11 One characteristic offense took place on 
June 17, 2014, when Holtzclaw stopped and questioned a seventeen-year-old 
Black woman for unknown reasons.12 After questioning her, Holtzclaw learned 
that the teenager had an outstanding arrest warrant for trespassing and reportedly 
told her to “take care of it before she turned 18 years old.”13 Later that day, 
 
 1. This is not her real name, but this is the name she goes by on social media. See Albert 
Samaha, An 18-Year-Old Said She Was Raped While in Police Custody. The Officers Say She 
Consented., BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/this-teenager-
accused-two-on-duty-cops-of-rape-she-had-no [https://perma.cc/LW4Y-CZKQ]. 
 2. Editorial, Close the Police Rape Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2018, at A20, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/opinion/police-rape-loophole.html [https://perma.cc/A2H2-
B9B7]. 
 3. See Samaha, supra note 1. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, LDF Urges Systemic Reforms to Eliminate Police 
Sexual Misconduct Following Sentencing of Daniel Holtzclaw, Former Oklahoma Police Officer, 
LEGAL DEF. FUND (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-urges-systemic-reforms-
to-eliminate-police-sexual-misconduct-following-sentencing-of-daniel-holtzclaw-former-oklahoma-
police-officer/ [https://perma.cc/SX6W-RXCM]; see also Kyle Schwab, Last Accuser Tells Jurors 
Former Police Officer Raped Her on Mom’s Porch in Northwest Oklahoma City, THE OKLAHOMAN 
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5464087 [https://perma.cc/DY4V-PSQU]. 
 11. See Joseph Diaz et al., Ex-Oklahoma City Cop Spending 263 Years in Prison for Rape and 
His Accusers Share Their Stories, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/oklahoma-
city-cop-spending-263-years-prison-rape/story?id=38517467 [https://perma.cc/R2UR-GYH9]. 
 12. See Schwab, supra note 10. 
 13. See id. 
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Holtzclaw again made contact with the teenager and drove her to her mother’s 
house.14 When the two arrived, Holtzclaw followed her to the porch.15 There, 
under the pretense of searching her, Holtzclaw “stuck his hands up under [her] 
shirt, under [her] bra and touched [her] breasts.”16 Afterwards, Holtzclaw turned 
the teenager around and raped her on her mother’s porch.17 
Both the Chambers and Holtzclaw allegations are examples of police sexual 
violence (PSV). While studies do not yet capture the full extent of PSV,18 we do 
know that it is widespread, underreported, and under addressed.19 What makes 
the Chambers and Holtzclaw cases remarkable, in other words, is not that 
members of the public were sexually assaulted by the very officers sworn to 
protect them. What makes these examples unusual is that they were actually 
reported and that one of the officers was held accountable for his crimes.20 
 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Most reports refer to PSV as “police sexual misconduct” (“PSM”). However, this Article 
will argue that police officers sexually assaulting arrestees in their custody is not mere misconduct, but 
rather an act of violence. For the purposes of consistency and for the sake of argument, any reference to 
PSV herein is synonymous with behavior traditionally recognized as PSM. 
 19. See Nancy Phillips et al., Extorting Sex with a Badge, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 13, 2006), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/Extorting_sex_with_a_badge.html 
[https://perma.cc/K76H-ST9J] (“Hundreds of police officers across the country have turned from 
protectors to predators, using the power of their badge to extort sex, an Inquirer review shows . . . . Most 
police departments do little to identify the offenders, and even less to stop them.”). Just recently, former 
Auburn, California police officer, Joseph James DeAngelo, was arrested in connection with a serious of 
killings, rapes, and assaults that transpired in the 1970s and 1980s. See Ray Sanchez et al., After 
Searching for More than 40 Years, Authorities Say an Ex-Cop is the Golden State Killer, CNN (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-development/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MVA-Q7BS]. DeAngelo was a police officer with the Auburn Police Department 
and the Exeter Police Department for six years, and authorities believe it is “[v]ery possibl[e]” that he 
committed some of the crimes during his time as a police officer. Id. Exeter Police Chief, John Hall, 
commented on the possibility that DeAngelo committed some of the crimes while acting as a police 
officer, stating, “It is absolutely shocking that someone can commit such heinous crimes, and finding 
out someone in a position of trust could betray that is absolutely unbelievable.” Id. DeAngelo faces 
capital murder charges and is being held without bail in Sacramento. Id. 
 20. See Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action in a 
Context Disproportionately Threatening Women of Color, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 153, 
155 (2016) (explaining that the Holtzclaw case “is unique in that it resulted in a criminal conviction and 
substantial penalty . . . .”). Prosecutors withdrew the original charges against the officers in Anna 
Chambers’s case and refiled charges of bribery and official misconduct. See Christina Carrega, Charges 
Dropped Against Ex-NYPD Officers Accused of Raping a Teen in Custody, ABC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/charges-dropped-nypd-officers-accused-raping-teen-
custody/story?id=61540692 [https://perma.cc/H8HU-GA3Z].  Both officers were eventually sentenced 
to five years of probation. See Andrew Denney, Ex-NYPD Cops Get Five Years’ Probation for Having 
Sex with Teen in Custody, NY POST (Oct. 10, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/10/10/ex-nypd-cops-get-
5-years-probation-for-having-sex-with-teen-in-custody/ [https://perma.cc/5G6Y-KE3N]. 
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The scale of PSV is staggering. A 2010 Cato Institute study found that PSV 
is the second-most reported form of police misconduct, after excessive force.21 
Multiple studies indicate that women of color have been disproportionately 
affected by PSV for years.22 PSV victims23 often do not report their assaults to 
the police,24 which suggests that the rate of PSV occurrence is even higher than 
existing reports indicate.25 PSV victims likely do not report their attacks for 
several reasons; including fear of retaliation, fear that no one will believe them, 
and fear that they will be blamed for the encounter.26 In the Holtzclaw case, for 
example, most of the victims did not report the assaults until Jannie Ligons—a 
fifty-seven-year-old woman who, unlike all the other victims, was not poor— 
became the first woman to report her assault.27 It was only after the initial 
investigation began and investigators reached out to other potential victims, 
reassuring them that their allegations would be taken seriously, that others were 
willing to make allegations against Holtzclaw on the record.28 Because victims 
of PSV do not believe that the police will protect them—indeed, a police officer 
has just committed violence against them—they do not report assaults to the 
police. Additionally, as one of Holtzclaw’s victims suggested, PSV victims 
likely do not know where to report or have any place in which they can report 
 
 21. CATO INST., NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT STATISTICS AND REPORTING PROJECT, 
ANN. REP. (2010), (on file with author) (“Sexual misconduct was the second most common form of 
misconduct reported throughout 2010 with 618 officers involved in sexual misconduct complaints 
during that period, 354 of which were involved in complaints that involved forcible non-consensual 
sexual activity such as sexual assault or sexual battery.”). 
 22. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 168. 
 23. Both the terms “victim” and “survivor” are often used to refer to people who have 
experienced sexual violence, and individual preferences differ from person to person. Compare Jan van 
Dijk, Free the Victim: A Critique of the Western Conception of Victimhood, 16 INT’L REV. 
VICTIMOLOGY 1, 2–3 (2009) with Danielle Campoamor, I’m Not a Sexual Assault “Survivor”–I’m a 
Victim, HARPER’S BAZAAR (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a20138398/stop-using-survivor-to-describe-sexual-
assault-victims/ [https://perma.cc/YTK4-G99A]. The word victim is often specifically used in the 
context of criminal law. See SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE, VICTIM OR SURVIVOR: TERMINOLOGY 
FROM INVESTIGATION THROUGH PROSECUTION, https://sakitta.org/toolkit/docs/Victim-or-Survivor-
Terminology-from-Investigation-Through-Prosecution.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5UZ-FSKE]. Another 
distinction is that victim refers to someone who has experienced sexual violence, where survivor may 
mean an individual who has moved through the process of recovery. See RAINN, KEY TERMS AND 
PHRASES, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases [https://perma.cc/2ACF-GYAA]. For 
these reasons, we use “victim” throughout this article. 
 24. See Zoë Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t Talking About, NATION (Aug. 27, 2014), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/XXG2-
M2L2] (interviewing an advocate of the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network who said, “Sexual 
assault is one of the most underreported crimes, and against police officers it’s probably even less 
reported”). 
 25. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 167 (explaining that the structural barriers precluding 
further research and understanding about PSV suggests that “the data currently available represents a 
fraction of a larger picture”). 
 26. See id. at 166, 155. 
 27. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1501 (2016). 
 28. See id; Trombadore, supra note 20, at 154. 
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PSV.29 Consequently, PSV remains underreported and under-researched despite 
statistics revealing its high rate of occurrence.30 
The problem is compounded by a lack of regulation, which offers police 
officers a legal defense that might seem absurd: consent. Despite the numerous 
studies highlighting the dangers of PSV, several states do not prohibit sexual 
activity between police officers and people in custody.31 In February 2018, 
BuzzFeed published an article identifying thirty-five states that do not explicitly 
prohibit law enforcement officers from having sexual contact with people in their 
custody.32 Chambers’s attorney, Michael David, similarly reported that at the 
time of the case, thirty-two states did not have laws expressly prohibiting the 
conduct.33 In such states, police officers accused of sexual assault can claim 
“consent” as a defense.34 Accordingly, despite the clear power imbalance 
between a police officer and a member of the public that the officer has stopped, 
questioned, held in custody, and perhaps even arrested, the officer can argue in 
response to a charge of sexual assault that their victim consented to the sexual 
activity.35 
The epidemic of PSV, both in scale and in concept, is startlingly 
underanalyzed. Sexual assaults committed by police against members of the 
public operate at the intersection of two vital national conversations about police 
brutality and sexual violence and harassment. This Article is the first to fully 
address PSV as the product of both issues and to recommend systemic solutions 
sounding in both debates, including key insights from the study of masculinities. 
The immediate problem PSV presents is that it is not made clearly illegal 
by state law and police department regulation. The deeper concern is that PSV is 
a symptom of broader cultural problems within police departments that can be 
helpfully parsed through the lens of masculinities theories. PSV arises from 
issues both with how police officers relate to the communities they patrol, 
especially men in those communities, and with how police officers and police 
culture treat women. The famous “blue wall of silence” ensuring loyalty even 
among police officers who commit misconduct magnifies these issues. Any 
 
 29. See Schwab, supra note 10. 
 30. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 155–56 (citing Danielle McGurrin & Victor E. Kappeler, 
Media Accounts of Police Sexual Violence: Rotten Apples or State-Supported Violence, in POLICING 
AND MISCONDUCT 121, 222 (Kim Michelle Lersch ed., 2002)). 
 31. See Samaha, supra note 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See James Ford, Woman Who Accused 2 NYPD Detectives of Raping Her Speaks Out, PIX 
11 (Apr. 5, 2018), http://pix11.com/2018/04/05/anna-chambers-woman-who-accused-2-nypd-
detectives-of-raping-her-while-in-custody-faces-them-and-speaks-out/ [https://perma.cc/W7AZ-
Q6P3]. 
 34. See Samaha, supra note 1. 
 35. Not all sexual assault committed by police officers is perpetrated by male police officers, 
and not all victims of PSV are female. As will be discussed further in Part III infra, the most common 
and often most vulnerable victims of PSV are women, particularly women of color and transgender 
women. Still, so as not to leave any experiences out, this Article will use gender-neutral pronouns. 
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attempt to meaningfully address PSV must take all of these factors into account 
to work both a legal and a cultural change. This Article offers such a solution. 
The Article begins with a comprehensive accounting of the problem of 
PSV: assessing the limited statistics regarding the prevalence of PSV and 
canvassing existing state laws prohibiting PSV.36 Part I addresses the power 
dynamic between police officers and members of the public in custody, adopting 
a vocabulary of expressed versus subjective intent to explain why actual consent 
in such a context is impossible. Part II then examines the deeper causes of PSV 
through the frame of masculinities. It uses the concept of “hegemonic 
masculinity” to explain the multiple ways in which police officer-civilian 
interactions are affected by police officers’ attempts to gain status with other 
men, particularly their fellow officers. Part III turns to a path forward, 
recommending substantive and procedural reforms to law and police department 
policy as well as proscriptive recommendations about how to shift police 
department culture. 
I. 
THE EPIDEMIC OF PSV 
While PSV has gained national attention recently, PSV has been an 
underreported epidemic, disproportionately affecting women of color living in 
lower socioeconomic areas. Any analysis of PSV must begin by assessing how 
commonly it occurs, as well as whom it most commonly affects. 
A. Defining PSV 
PSV is an umbrella term that encompasses any coercion committed by a 
police officer with a sexualized component.37 This spans a wide range of acts, 
“from sexual harassment and extortion to forcible rape by officers.”38 Although 
a uniform legal definition of PSV does not currently exist, New York’s Policy 
and Advocacy Unit of the Civilian Complaint Review Board provides a helpful 
example, defining PSV as: 
[V]erbal harassment of someone because of that person’s sex, gender 
identity, or sexual orientation, as well as conduct involving the actual or 
 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. Scholars writing about PSV have used different terms, including police sexual misconduct 
as well as police sexual violence. Some commenters use the terms to distinguish between allegedly 
transactional exchanges of sexual activity and a police officer using discretion not to arrest or otherwise 
punish a member of the public and violent interactions in which the victim argued no consent took place. 
Because this Article argues that consent is impossible in sexual interactions between members of the 
public and police officers, it uses PSV in its broadest sense. For a helpful summary of this distinction, 
see Trombadore, supra note 20, at 171–72. 
 38. Andrea J. Ritchie, How Some Cops Use the Badge to Commit Sex Crimes, WASH. POST. 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-some-cops-use-the-badge-to-commit-
sex-crimes/2018/01/11/5606fb26-eff3-11e7-b390-
a36dc3fa2842_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d0bcabf4ae4 [https://perma.cc/52AJ-JPP5] 
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threatened use of physical contact or force, including rape, assault, 
unwanted touching, and other forms of physical sexual contact . . . with 
witnesses, victims, and defendants with whom members of service come 
into contact as a result of their job assignments.39 
The U.S. Department of Justice similarly defines PSV as “sexual assault [by a 
law enforcement officer] without consent (rape), sexual contact procured by 
force, threat of force or coercion, and unwanted or gratuitous sexual contact such 
as touching or groping.”40 Most states, scholars, and scholarly reports, however, 
either do not define PSV at all or define the violence in very different ways.41 
This lack of uniformity in defining PSV may be one reason why PSV has not 
been adequately addressed by state legislatures.42 Without a specific definition 
of PSV, legislatures may have difficulty conceptualizing the root of the problem, 
and thus, how to address it through the law.43 
B. Prevalence of PSV 
Because of the differing definitions of PSV, as well as other issues such as 
underreporting, it is functionally impossible to establish how many incidents of 
PSV occur per year. Even assuming under-inclusion and underreporting, 
however, numbers of reported incidents of sexual violence committed by police 
officers are disturbingly high. One six-year study conducted between 2009 and 
2014 revealed that nearly one thousand police officers nationwide lost their 
licenses as a result of sexual violence allegations.44 Notably, the study surveyed 
only “state and local police, sheriff’s officials, prison guards and school resource 
officers,”45 not federal officers. The study revealed that, of the nearly one 
thousand police officers who lost their license as a result of sexual violence, 549 
police officers lost their licenses based on allegations of sexual assault or rape.46 
Of those 549 police officers, 154 of them sexually assaulted prisoners.47 The 
study does not go into detail about how many police officers, if any, lost their 
license as a result of sexually assaulting a person in their custody.48 
Buffalo News conducted a similar national study that revealed more than 
seven hundred credible cases of PSV in a span of ten years, ranging from 2005 
 
 39. Memorandum from N.Y.’s Policy & Advocacy Unit of the Civil Complaint Review Bd. 1 
(Feb. 14, 2018) (on file with author). 
 40. Law Enforcement Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcement-misconduct#sex [https://perma.cc/B8FB-5NCS]  
 41. Trombadore, supra note 20, at 163. 
 42. See id. at 175. 
 43. See id. (“[U]nity in problem formulation has the potential to mobilize entire movements.”). 
 44. See AP Investigation into Officer Sex Misconduct, by the Numbers, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Oct. 31, 2015), https://apnews.com/f61d495bb41d47968679c5b89a9907fc [https://perma.cc/8FRE-
FFX8]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
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to 2015.49 The study concluded that in more than 70 percent of the seven hundred 
cases, “officers wielded their authority over motorists, crime victims, 
informants, students and young people in job-shadowing programs.”50 Of the 
police officers named in the data, only five offenders were women.51 Nearly all 
of the victims were women and adolescents.52 Former police officer Timothy 
Maher stated that these numbers are “just the tip of the iceberg.”53 
Reported numbers fail to capture the actual number of PSV incidents for 
several reasons. One reason focuses on the status of the perpetrators: victims feel 
that other police officers will not view their allegations as reliable. Victims are 
understandably hesitant to report PSV when the entity to which the victim would 
typically file a claim is their abuser’s place of employment.54 For obvious 
reasons, victims believe their abuser’s employment and the loyalty of his 
coworkers will prevent their claims from being taken seriously. One of 
Holtzclaw’s victims, for example, explained “I didn’t think that [anyone] would 
believe me. I feel like all police will work together.”55 When asked why she did 
not report the rape to the police, another of Holtzclaw’s victims stated, “‘What’s 
the good of telling on the police? . . . What kind of police do you call on the 
police?’”56 These testimonies are illustrative of the distrust victims feel when 
their abuser is a police officer, tainting the trust that they might otherwise feel 
that reporting the crime will lead to an investigation and arrest.57 
There is even reason to believe that occasional media attention on 
horrifying examples of PSV, such as Holtzclaw’s crimes, further discourages 
victims of PSV, and possibly victims of all crimes, to report them. Sociologists 
Matthew Desmond, Andrew Papachristos, and David Kirk analyzed how often 
members of the public called 911 to report crimes in Milwaukee in the wake of 
a highly publicized example of police brutality against a Black man.58 They 
concluded that “publicized cases of police violence against unarmed [B]lack men 
have a clear and significant impact on citizen crime reporting.”59 According to 
their study, individuals living in predominantly Black neighborhoods were less 
likely to call 911 to report crimes for a year following the media coverage, 
 
 49. See Matthew Spina, When a Protector Becomes a Predator, BUFF. NEWS (Nov. 22, 2015), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/bncore/projects/abusing-the-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/B5H7-
D2M8]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (“Victims may be even less likely to report [PSV] offenses when they fear it will be 
their word versus an officer’s.”). 
 55. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 154. 
 56. Schwab, supra note 10. 
 57. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 166. 
 58. Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black 
Community, 81 AMER. SOC. REV. 857 (2016). 
 59.  Id. at 870. 
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resulting in twenty thousand fewer calls to the police.60 It seems logical that 
victims of PSV would follow a similar pattern and be even less likely to report 
their assault in the wake of news, for example, that the officers accused of raping 
Anna Chambers received only probation. 
Another central reason for underreporting is the identity of the victims most 
commonly assaulted by perpetrators of PSV. The victimology of PSV is deeply 
intersectional61 as police officers typically “target the most vulnerable—namely 
women of color, transgender and gender-nonconforming people, victims of 
domestic abuse, and people suspected of engaging in criminalized activity—to 
reduce the risk that their misconduct will be reported . . . .”62 Police officers 
generally target these vulnerable groups because the groups are “often perceived 
as less credible,”63 and thus are unlikely to succeed in reporting a police officer 
for PSV.64 A member of the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network advocacy 
group explained that police officers prey on these groups of people by making 
comments such as, “If you report me, then I’m going to report that you were 
breaking X, Y, or Z law.”65 
Unsurprisingly, PSV disproportionately affects women of color.66 A 
number of cultural and historical reasons combine to make women of color, 
particularly Black women and girls, especially vulnerable to PSV. Sexual 
exploitation of Black women by White men in formal positions of power over 
them has been a shameful part of this nation’s history since slavery.67 This 
exploitation is worsened by stereotypes and revisionist history that sexualizes 
Black women and girls, characterizing them as more likely to have consented to 
what was in fact a sexual assault.68 Given the communities that are more likely 
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to have repeated interactions with law enforcement69 and the ongoing role of 
purported consent in PSV, it is unsurprising that Black women have been 
disproportionately victimized by PSV. 
Black women, of course, are not the only women of color that are 
disproportionately affected by PSV. Latinx women, American Indian and Alaska 
Native women, and LGBTQ+ women also face a higher risk of sexual assault 
than heterosexual White women.70 All of these groups of women have 
historically been sexually exploited and otherwise marginalized, making 
victimization and oppression more common and less likely to be punished.71 
While women generally are disproportionately impacted by rape and sexual 
assault,72 women of color run an even higher risk of rape or sexual assault as a 
result of their race and their gender.73 Although approximately 60 percent of the 
population identifies as White,74 only 18 percent of rape victims are White. The 
rate of victimization of nonwhite people is strikingly disproportionate to their 
numbers in the overall population.75 
The particular vulnerability of women of color, however, is not meant to 
exclude men, specifically men of color, who have also been targets of PSV. One 
of the most notorious examples of PSV occurred in August 1997, when a Haitian 
man named Abner Louima was arrested and taken back to the police station, 
where two New York Police Department officers brutally sodomized him with a 
broomstick.76 Louima suffered from a ruptured bladder and colon, causing him 
to spend two months in the hospital.77 The two officers were only sentenced to a 
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few years of probation.78 Louima’s assault has become one of the most famous 
examples of sexual assault of a male victim, and an exception to widespread 
dismissal or even laughing reactions to male victims of sexual assault.79  
Even police officers recognize that PSV is a widespread and significant 
problem.80 Norm Stamper, a former Seattle police chief, published a book in 
which he stated, “You won’t find a major law enforcement agency that has been 
around for more than five minutes that has not had a chapter in its history of 
sexual abuse by a police officer on duty. We’ve got too many rapists in 
uniform.”81 Penny Harrington, former police chief of Portland, Oregon, and 
founder of the National Center for Women and Policing, also implicitly 
acknowledged the problem when she said, “The women are terrified . . . . Who 
are they going to call? It’s the police who are abusing them.”82 Finally, Sarasota 
Police Chief Bernadette DiPino remarked, “It’s happening in probably every law 
enforcement agency across the country.”83 
Despite current and former police officers in high positions of power 
acknowledging this problem, state legislatures have failed to adequately address 
the issue. And in spite of the underreporting of PSV discussed briefly above, 
PSV is still the second-most reported form of police violence, after excessive 
force.84 Until legislatures recognize the importance and immediate harm this 
issue poses to people subjected to the criminal justice system, “women will 
continue to pay a heavy price.”85 The next Section turns to what statutes currently 
exist that address PSV and why they are inadequate. 
C. Current Laws Prohibiting PSV and an Introduction to the Power 
Dynamic 
In all fifty states, it remains a crime for anyone, including law enforcement 
officers, to commit sexual assault.86 However, approximately thirty states do not 
have statutes expressly prohibiting sexual conduct between a law enforcement 
officer and a person in custody.87 Albert Samaha’s BuzzFeed article discussing 
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Anna Chambers’s case included a graphic identifying which states specifically 
prohibited police officers from having sexual contact with a member of the 
public held in custody, showing only fifteen states with such a specific 
prohibition.88 Since that article was published, several states have passed or 
considered statutes attempting to address PSV, but a majority still lack any direct 
prohibition.89 
Existing statutes address the illegality of sexual contact between law 
enforcement and members of the public in a variety of ways.90 Some states 
explicitly say “law enforcement” or “peace officer” in definitions of prohibited 
conduct, making clear that any sexual contact between a member of the police 
and a member of the public is a crime. Arizona’s statute is one of the most 
straightforward, stating that “[a] peace officer commits unlawful sexual conduct 
by knowingly engaging in sexual contact, oral sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with any person who is in the officer’s custody or a person who the 
officer knows or has reason to know is the subject of an investigation.”91  
A number of statutes both name police officers and focus on persons in 
custody. Alaska, for example, specifies that if “while employed in the state by a 
law enforcement agency as a peace officer” the officer “engages in sexual 
penetration with a person with reckless disregard that the person is in the custody 
or the apparent custody of the offender, or is committed to the custody of a law 
enforcement agency,” that officer has committed sexual assault in the third 
degree.92 Hawaii similarly prohibits a law enforcement officer from “knowingly 
subject[ing] to sexual penetration . . . a person in custody.”93 California forbids 
“peace officer[s]” from engaging in sexual activity with anyone “confined in a 
detention facility,” which includes interview and interrogation rooms as well as 
vehicles used to transport people after their arrest.94  
Other states use a broader description of the circumstances in which sexual 
activity is not permitted than when a person is in custody. For example, Kansas 
lists “traffic stop, a custodial interrogation, an interview in connection with an 
investigation, or while the law enforcement officer has such person detained” as 
circumstances in which sexual contact between an officer and member of the 
 
 88. Id. 
 89.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.7 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5512 (2019); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:41.1 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-314 (West 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3259 (West 2018).  
 90. The graphic labels Indiana as a state with a specific prohibition of sexual contact between 
police officers and members of the public, but the authors were unable to locate a statute establishing 
that offense. See Samaha, supra note 1. 
 91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1412(A) (2020). 
 92. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.425(a)(4) (West 2019). If the officer engages in sexual contact, 
rather than sexual penetration, the offense is sexual assault only in the fourth degree. ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 11.41.427(a)(3) (West 2019). 
 93. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-731(1)(c)(v) (West 2020). 
 94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6(a)(2) (West 2020). 
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public is illegal.95 Florida specifies that any “law enforcement officer, 
correctional officer, or correctional probation officer” is guilty of a felony if they 
commit actions that fit under the general definition of sexual battery while they 
are “acting in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the 
offender is in a position of control or authority as an agent or employee of 
government.”96 Along similar lines, Colorado prohibits any peace officer from 
having sexual activity with someone contacted “for the purpose of law 
enforcement or . . . the exercise of the officer’s employment activities,” someone 
who is or the officer causes to believe is the subject of an active investigation, or 
someone to whom the officer makes “any show of real or apparent authority.”97 
All of the above statutes specifically identify members of law enforcement 
and prohibit a relatively broad range of sexual acts, although they display some 
variety in whether the victim is in custody, the subject of an active investigation, 
or simply subject to the police officer’s authority. By contrast, other states focus 
more on the custodial aspect, rather than necessarily identifying law enforcement 
officers specifically.98 North Carolina statutes simply prohibit:  
[A] person having custody of a victim of any age or a person who is an 
agent or employee of any person, or institution, whether such institution 
is private, charitable, or governmental, having custody of a victim of 
any age engag[ing] in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with such 
victim . . . .99  
Oregon defines a crime called “custodial sexual misconduct,” which occurs 
where a state employee has sexual intercourse with a person “in the custody of a 
law enforcement agency following arrest.”100 Washington is more specific, 
establishing the same offense where “the perpetrator is a law enforcement 
officer” and the victim is “detained, under arrest, or in the custody of a law 
enforcement officer,” and further notes that “[c]onsent of the victim is not a 
defense to prosecution.”101 Utah defines “custodial sexual relations” where the 
victim is “a person in custody,” and similarly specifies that consent is not a 
defense.102 
Still more states tweak the custodial description slightly by emphasizing 
control or other supervisory authority exercised by the perpetrator over their 
victim, the approach suggested in the Model Penal Code.103 For example, Ohio 
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bans sexual conduct where one person is “in custody of law . . . and the offender 
has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the other person.”104 North Dakota 
prohibits sexual contact between a person “in official custody or detained in a 
hospital, prison, or other institution” and an actor who has “supervisory or 
disciplinary authority over that other person.”105 New Jersey includes in its 
definition of sexual assault circumstances where “[t]he victim is on probation or 
parole, or detained in a hospital, prison or other institution and the actor has 
supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal, 
professional or occupational status.”106 Connecticut establishes that if someone 
“is detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or 
disciplinary authority over such other person,” the actor is guilty of sexual 
assault.107 Georgia states that someone “who has supervisory or disciplinary 
authority over another individual commits sexual assault” when the perpetrator 
“[i]s an employee or agent of a law enforcement agency and engages in sexual 
contact with such other individual who the actor knew or should have known is 
contemporaneously . . . being detained by or is in the custody of any law 
enforcement agency.”108 Oklahoma focuses on the victim, specifying that rape 
has occurred “[w]here the victim is under the legal custody or supervision of a 
state agency, a federal agency, a county, a municipality or a political subdivision 
and engages in sexual intercourse with a state, federal, county, municipal or 
political subdivision employee or an employee of a contractor of the state, the 
federal government, a county, a municipality or a political subdivision that 
exercises authority over the victim.”109 Notably, some states prohibit sexual 
contact between a person with supervisory or disciplinary authority and a person 
under that authority, but only where the person in authority uses that authority to 
coerce the victim to submit.110 
These states are the only ones that criminalize sexual activity between a 
police officer and a member of the public. In the majority of states, only general 
sexual assault statutes apply. Therefore, if a person in custody alleges that a 
police officer sexually assaulted them, the police officer can raise consent as a 
defense and argue that the sexual contact was consensual sexual activity rather 
than sexual assault. This is particularly pernicious due to the assumption, in 
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“much of the policing literature” that “police are a desired sexual commodity 
who are routinely tempted by women willing to trade ‘sexual favors’ for 
leniency.”111 
This defense is problematic because it ignores the power dynamic between 
a police officer and a civilian in custody—a power dynamic that many have 
argued “makes consent impossible.”112 New York Assemblyman Edward 
Braunstein, who sponsored the successful New York bill, argued that “[t]he 
power dynamic between an individual in custody and a law enforcement officer 
is such that the person in custody is powerless to consent to sexual activity.”113 
The New York Civil Liberties Union counselors concluded the same, reasoning 
that “[a]nyone in police custody implicitly understands . . . that not going along 
with a police officer’s wishes could have serious adverse consequences.”114 The 
next Section addresses the power dynamic between police officer and civilian in 
more specificity. 
1. The Power Dynamic: Law Enforcement Officers and “Consenting” 
Civilians in Custody 
While a definition of consent does not exist,115 there is a general 
understanding that consent indicates a person’s willingness to engage in a 
particular sexual act.116 There are two dimensions to this consent. First, there is 
expressed consent: a verbal or physical manifestation of consent.117 Second, 
there is subjective consent: the internal, subjective choice to engage in sexual 
activity. Ideally, both expressed consent and subjective consent are present. In 
some circumstances, however, this is not the case. For example, a person might 
give expressed consent while not wanting to engage in sexual activity because 
fear, threats, or coercion made them feel as if they had no choice. Conversely, a 
person engaged in sadomasochistic practices might subjectively want sexual 
 
 111. Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring Police Sexual 
Violence Against Women, 12 JUST. Q. 85, 88 (1995). 
 112. Bodde et al., supra note 85. 
 113. Assembly Passes Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Contact Between Police Officers and 
Individuals in Custody, N.Y. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLYMAN EDWARD C. BRAUNSTEIN ASSEMBLY DISTR. 
26 (Feb. 7, 2018), http://nyassembly.gov/mem/?ad=026&sh=story&story=79457 
[https://perma.cc/4432-DUG9]. 
 114. Bodde et al., supra note 85. 
 115. See Legal Role of Consent, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/legal-role-consent 
[https://perma.cc/7K8E-HRQS] (“There is no single legal definition of consent.”). 
 116. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
77, 117 (2010). 
 117. For conceptual purposes, expressed consent could arguably include permission that is 
implied through the absence of protest, as opposed to affirmative consent. 
2020] POLICE SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1503 
contact but—because of their preferences for masochistic role-playing—express 
non-consent.118 
PSV implicates both mismatches in ways that demonstrate the need for a 
bright-line rule prohibiting sexual contact between an on duty police officer and 
a member of the public. First, the nature of the relationship between a police 
officer and a member of the public demonstrates why the risk of expressed but 
not subjective consent is so high. When a police officer has a person in their 
custody, the power the police officer holds over that civilian effectively makes 
subjective intent irrelevant.  
To determine whether a sexual act between a person in a position of power 
and a person not similarly situated was consensual, the key question is whether 
the victim participated in the sexual demands as a result of coercion. In the 
context of a police officer and a person in custody, we argue that the potential 
for coercion is so great that there can never be meaningful consent.119 
Imagine an allegation of sexual assault against a police officer in which the 
officer argues the sexual encounter was consensual. Assume that the factfinder 
is convinced that the member of the public expressed consent. Even then, the 
police officer’s control over the civilian renders subjective intent absent. As 
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael has argued, the power imbalance means that any 
purported consent is the product of a “one-sided abuse of power rather than 
through mutual agreement.”120 Therefore, the outward appearance of permission 
cannot be viewed as actual consent because it is “affected heavily by fears, 
pressures, and constraints” resulting from the abuser’s power.121  
This further implicates a distinction between nonconsensual and unwanted 
sex. For example, Robin West defined a difference between the two: 
Sometimes unwanted sex is non-consensual, and when it is, it is rape. 
Sometimes, however, unwanted (or unwelcome or undesired) sex is 
“consensual,” in all the ways that matter to law, and when such, it is not 
rape, and . . . not the target of criminal rape law. However, even 
consensual sex that is unwanted—meaning, unwanted sex that is not 
rape—might nevertheless be harmful, injurious, and the product of not-
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so-subtle background conditions of necessity and coercion . . . .122 
West thus concluded that there are undeniably instances in which a person is 
incapable of consenting to sexual activity. The law, however, does not currently 
capture these situations—where there is a lack of subjective consent—if 
expressed consent is arguably or theoretically present.123  
PSV is a prime example of such unwanted sex. Undoubtedly, many 
incidents of PSV are lacking both expressed and subjective consent. But given 
the power differential between a police officer and a member of the public, the 
risk of unwanted sex with expressed but not subjective consent is unacceptably 
high. Even further, we argue that in the context of PSV, subjectively wanted sex 
should be considered nonconsensual. In other words, even if it could be proven 
that a person in custody actually expressed consent and acknowledged their 
subjective consent, any sexual contact between that person and a police officer 
holding them in custody should be considered PSV and illegal.  
One justification for a bright-line rule is to avoid difficult evidentiary 
determinations. Such determinations may rely upon biased judgments of the 
credibility of sexual assault victims, particularly women.124 The power 
imbalance inherent in the relationship between law enforcement officers and 
civilians makes any type of consent suspect at best and functionally meaningless 
at worst. 
A second justification for a bright-line rule is a stronger statement of 
principle: the context of a police officer holding a civilian in custody vitiates 
consent. This may seem like an overly rigid rule, but similar bright-line rules 
regarding consent apply in other comparable contexts.  
The most familiar rule of strict liability regarding consent is probably 
statutory rape. The crime of statutory rape is based on a simple concept: people 
below a certain age are legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity.125 In 
the majority of states, therefore, a person who has sexual intercourse with a 
minor is guilty of statutory rape, even if the adult honestly believed that the minor 
was over the age of consent.126 Although the simplicity of the rule is a useful 
comparison, the justification for the rule is different in an important way: a minor 
is considered less competent to make decisions regarding sexual activity than an 
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adult. No such principle is applicable to people in the custody of law 
enforcement, and the comparison raises potentially problematic assumptions 
about female agency and sexual decision-making that historically undergirded 
gendered statutory rape laws.127 
A much closer analogy provides a clearer parallel: people held in prison. 
Even jurisdictions that do not explicitly reject the concept of “consensual” sex 
with a person in law enforcement custody generally recognize the imbalanced 
power dynamic inherent in the custodial relationship between prisoners and 
prison guards.128 These jurisdictions have implemented laws to protect 
vulnerable persons from exploitation by corrections officers.129 Moreover, 
“[s]ome United States district courts have concluded that the inherent 
power differential between guards and inmates makes sexual relationships 
between them coercive,” thereby deeming any sexual activity between them to 
be nonconsensual.130 
At the federal level, for example, the U.S. Congress implemented the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA), which “established a ‘zero-tolerance 
standard’ for rape in prisons in the United States.”131 Implementation of the 
PREA underscores that “in a custodial context, consent is a legal 
impossibility.”132 The federal government and a majority of states have since 
followed suit by criminalizing sexual activity between prison workers and those 
in their custody.133 The statutory language of such bans is explicit and clear. For 
example, multiple states say outright that purported consent of an inmate is not 
a defense to alleged violations of the statute.134 Proposed revisions to the Model 
Penal Code similarly criminalize sexual contact between someone who “holds 
any position of authority or supervision” over a victim “detained in a . . . 
 
 127. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
387, 404–06 (1984). 
 128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-701 (2019). 
 129. See id. (detailing that an inmate is incapable of consenting to sexual acts with a correction 
officer). 
 130. Merideth J. Hogan, If Orange is the New Black, is Coercion the New Consent? An Analysis 
of the Tenth Circuits Decision to Allow Guards to Use an Inmate’s Alleged Consent as a Defense in a 
Sexual Abuse Allegation [Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013)], 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 425, 425–26 (2015). 
 131. Implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act, Presidential Memorandum, 77 Fed. Reg. 
20873 (May 17, 2012), appended to 34 U.S.C. § 30301 (2018). 
 132. Deborah M. Golden, It’s Not in My Head: The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 39 (2004). 
 133. See id. at 40 n. 16 (listing statutes). 
 134. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3017(a) (West 2001) (stating specifically that “[c]onsent is 
not a defense to a prosecution under §§ 22-3013 to 22-3016”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.35(3)(b)(3) (West 
2019) (prohibiting sexual activity, defined therein, between inmates and prison guards, and specifically 
stating that “[t]he consent of the inmate or offender supervised by the department in the community to 
any act of sexual misconduct may not be raised as a defense to a prosecution under this paragraph”); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-332.01 (2006) (explaining that consent is not a defense to “sexual penetration or 
sexual conduct”). 
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custodial institution” or has a “status involving state-imposed restrictions on 
liberty.”135 
Despite formally recognizing the power imbalance between inmates and 
prison guards, only a handful of states explicitly prohibit sexual activity between 
law enforcement officers and those in their custody.136 Even fewer states 
explicitly codify that consent is not a defense to such sexual activity.137 Yet a 
police officer’s relationship with a person in custody is comparable to the 
relationship between a prison guard and a prisoner. Most importantly, and most 
obviously, police officers have a custodial relationship with an arrestee similar 
to that between a prison guard and a prisoner. A police officer has the ability to 
deprive someone of their liberty if they are accused (or threatened with a charge) 
of breaking a law.138 Because of the power dynamic resulting from the 
relationship between police officers and those in their custody, as well as prison 
guards and prisoners, consent to sexual activity under the pressure of the criminal 
justice system is not possible.139 
One response to this conclusion is to argue that a bright-line rule stating 
that a member of the public cannot consent to sexual activity with a police officer 
takes away the agency and autonomy of a member of the public who actually 
wants to engage in the sexual activity.140 This is true to the extent that their 
consent would be rendered effectively meaningless for certain types of 
interactions. If a member of the public wishes to engage in sexual activity with 
a police officer, however, they would be free to do so when that officer is off 
duty. Given the substantial risk of unwanted sexual activity as described above, 
it is a comparably small restriction on the rights of both police officers and their 
willing sexual partners to require that any sexual interactions take place in a 
context that guarantees meaningful consent. 
2. Police Departments’ Policies (or Lack Thereof) Addressing PSV 
Even where state law does not criminalize sexual activity between police 
officers and those in custody, internal police procedures could provide an 
alternative form of regulation, offering potentially milder sanctions while still 
expressing an internal norm against such behavior. Unfortunately, as with 
 
 135. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES §§ 213.4(1)(b)(i)–(ii) 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). 
 136. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g.., State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797, 799, 801 (La. 1976) (holding a police officer 
accountable for extortion when he forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening 
to arrest her). 
 139. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 116, at 82 (“[C]onsent to sex is not obtained when it 
is induced by fears and pressures stemming from sexual abuse of power.”). 
 140. For a similar argument in a different context, see Leigh Goodmark’s criticism of domestic 
violence mandatory arrest policies as prioritizing “safety and accountability over autonomy.” Leigh 
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
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statutes prohibiting such behavior, most police departments do not have official 
policies regarding sexual activity with civilians. 
While there is no recent data detailing precisely how many police 
departments across the United States have such policies, several reports in recent 
years detailed a lack of police department policies addressing PSV.141 In 2017, 
for example, Andrea J. Ritchie and Delores Jones-Brown examined the policies 
of thirty-six police departments across the country, including a majority of the 
nation’s top thirty law enforcement agencies.142 Their research revealed that 
“[a]lthough departments generally had a policy explicitly prohibiting sexual 
harassment and misconduct among employees, more than half had no policy 
explicitly prohibiting [PSM] against members of the public.”143  
Ritchie and Brown’s research also compared several police department 
policies regarding PSV. Some policies were extremely detailed, but most were 
vague or not sufficiently descriptive.144 For example, Montgomery County, 
Maryland’s police department policy prohibited PSV under the larger umbrella 
of sexual harassment, stating that “[c]ounty employees must not subject other 
employees, contractors, consultants, citizens, applicants, customers, or clients to 
sexual harassment. An employee found to have engaged in sexual harassment 
will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, which may include 
dismissal.”145 The policy then defined sexual harassment as: 
[R]equests for sexual favors; the use of threats or force to obtain sexual 
favors; sexual propositions or innuendo; suggestive comments; sexually 
oriented teasing or joking; jokes about gender-specific traits; 
unwelcome or uninvited touching, patting, pinching, or brushing against 
another’s body; obscene spoken or written language; obscene gestures, 
and display of offensive or obscene printed or visual material.146 
This policy encompasses a wide range of PSV. It does not, however, 
acknowledge PSV as a specific form of harm or discuss the imbalanced power 
relationship between police officer and civilian that would negate expressed 
consent.  
Nonetheless, the level of detail of prohibited conduct in Montgomery 
County’s policy is arguably better than even shorter examples such as 
Washington, D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department, which states only that 
“[o]fficers shall . . . [n]ot conduct themselves in an immoral, indecent, lewd, or 
 
 141. See e.g., Timothy M. Maher, Police Sexual Misconduct: Officers’ Perceptions of Its Extent 
and Causality, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 355, 377 (2003) (“No agency represented in this sample had a 
formal written policy on PSM.”). 
 142. See Andrea J. Ritchie & Delores Jones-Brown, Policing Race, Gender, and Sex: A Review 
of Law Enforcement Policies, 27 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2017). The nation’s top thirty law 
enforcement agencies were determined by looking at the number of officers on the force. Id. 
 143. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
 144. See id. at 34–36. 
 145. Id. at 34. 
 146. Id. 
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disorderly manner or in [sic] manner which might be construed by an observer 
as immoral, indecent, lewd, or disorderly.”147 If police department policies are 
meant to express an internal norm condemning PSV, such broad edicts are less 
helpful. Indeed, at least some police officers who engage in sexual contact with 
members of the public likely do not believe they are committing an immoral or 
lewd act. 
Montgomery County Police Department and Washington, D.C.’s 
Metropolitan Police Department have one thing in common: both police 
departments actually have a policy discussing PSV. Their existing PSV policies 
put them in the minority.148 As Ritchie and Brown’s research revealed, most 
police departments in the United States do not have PSV policies at all.149 
Consequently, two major problems arise: (1) there is silence around PSV, which 
marginalizes victims of PSV or makes them feel alone in their experience, and 
(2) offending police officers are subsequently kept on the job, a process known 
as the “officer shuffle,” which puts more people in danger.150 
First, the lack of police department policies defining PSV has led to a lack 
of uniformity in what the behavior truly constitutes.151 Prior studies suggest that 
when a victim of a crime does not know how that crime is characterized, they 
are more likely to feel alone and as if they are the only victim.152 Equally 
troubling is the contrast in treatment of different types of police misconduct: 
“excessive use of force” is defined and regulated by nearly all police 
departments, yet PSV is not.153 Treating PSV differently than other misconduct 
 
 147. Id. at 35. 
 148. See id. at 33 
 149. See id. (“The majority of departments have no policies or training in place explicitly 
addressing [PSV].”). 
 150. See ANDREA RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN 
AND WOMEN OF COLOR 121 (2017) [hereinafter RITCHIE, INVISIBLE].] 
 151. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 170 (“Structural barriers and vague descriptions are not 
the only factors that render [PSM] a hidden phenomenon; much of the difficulty in studying this problem 
stems from a lack of convention of what constitutes officer-involved sexual misconduct.”). 
 152. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE supra note 150, at 105 (detailing a story about a woman in a post-
Katrina New Orleans workshop who never told anyone about her PSV story until that workshop—
fourteen years after the assault—because she said she had never “heard anyone talk about sexual 
violence as part of the fabric of police violence, or about police as perpetrators of sexual violence”); see 
also Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom 
Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183, 184 (2017) (explaining that stealthing victims did not know 
how to describe their stealthing experience because the sexual violence did not have a specific name); 
Jenavieve Hatch, Victims of Stealthing Open Up About Why It’s So Damaging, HUFFPOST (May 5, 
2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/victims-of-stealthing-open-up-about-why-its-so-
damaging_us_59134ad1e4b0a58297e1ad88 [https://perma.cc/HN48-37FB] (quoting a stealthing 
survivor that stated “I was such a silly young girl at the time [of my stealthing experience], I really put 
all the blame on myself for making a terrible choice in a partner. Now that I have read a few articles on 
the apparent frequency of this happening to women, I think my mind is changing a bit”). 
 153. See The Project, POLICE USE OF FORCE PROJECT, http://useofforceproject.org/#review 
[https://perma.cc/6MHJ-JZ26] (explaining that most police departments have use of force policies even 
though most policies lack basic protections). 
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such as “police brutality” and “excessive use of force” obscures that PSV is a 
natural extension of societal sexual violence.154 
The silence surrounding PSV also helps to distort the prevalence of the 
offense. In her famous book, Invisible No More, Ritchie poses an interesting 
question: “What is the first image that comes to your mind when I say police 
brutality?”155 The question is answered almost exactly the same way every time 
she asks it—“a [W]hite cop beating a Black man (almost always imagined as 
heterosexual and cisgender) with a baton.”156 Hardly ever, Ritchie reports, has 
the response been sexual violence. If it ever comes up, people usually discuss 
Abner Louima’s case.157 The phrase “police brutality” almost never incites 
thoughts or discussions about women of color being sexually abused, harassed, 
or violated by police.158 Ritchie speculated that the absence of women of color 
in discussions of police brutality may be “merely one strand in a seamless web 
of daily gendered/racialized assaults by both state and private actors, unworthy 
of the focused attention commanded by police brutality against men of color 
perceived as a ‘direct’ form of state violence.”159 
As discussion progresses, even more of a paradox emerges. An initial 
inquiry about police brutality almost never brings PSV to mind. Once Ritchie 
frames PSV as a form of “police brutality,” however, she reports that at least one 
person has a PSV experience to share, usually one that has never been shared 
with anyone before.160 Ritchie’s experiences highlight that once PSV is given a 
uniform definition and a national platform by police departments nationwide, 
victims will be more likely to talk about their experiences with PSV rather than 
conceal their trauma.161 
A second major consequence of inconsistent or absent police department 
policies is that minimizing discipline allows officers to offend again. 
Commentators have frequently criticized a practice known as the “officer 
shuffle,” where a police officer found guilty of misconduct is sent to another 
jurisdiction rather than dismissed from the police force entirely.162 Police officers 
 
 154. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 104; see also Andrea J. Ritchie, Law 
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suspected of misconduct are allowed to resign rather than face discipline, then 
given recommendations or references to assist them in securing employment in 
another department.163 
The officer shuffle occurs (and is criticized) for many types of misconduct, 
but it can be particularly problematic in the context of PSV as studies show that 
sexual offenders tend to commit their crimes over and over.164 In general, sexual 
crimes have a high recidivism rate.165 For example, one study found that in the 
general population (not solely police officers), offenders who were not caught 
and prosecuted averaged more than five rapes.166 Data indicates that this holds 
true for police officers who commit sexual violence: one study found that 
approximately 40 percent of the analyzed incidents of PSV were committed by 
an officer with at least one prior incident of PSV.167 In the context of PSV, the 
officer shuffle only works to perpetuate more sexual violence against citizens. 
The officer shuffle and the silence surrounding PSV present significant 
dangers for both victims and citizens in general. The lack of effective policies, 
or any policies at all, addressing PSV almost inevitably sends a message to police 
officers: sexual violence against a civilian in your custody may not be a crime, 
but even if it is, you will get away with it and even if you do not, you can simply 
transfer to another department and commit sexual assault once again.168 
It is a bare minimum first step to make legally explicit that a civilian in 
police custody cannot consent to any sexual activity with a police officer. This 
formal legal change, however, is not enough. As the next Section will 
demonstrate, the systemic problem of PSV arises out of a culture of police self-
protection and hegemonic masculinity that will not be adequately addressed by 
a single change in the formal definition of consent and sexual assault in the 
context of police custody. 
 
offender officers were more likely to have previously worked at another police station); see also 
Trombadore, supra note 20, at 167 (“Officer shuffle occurs when discredited officers move between 
departments despite allegations of misconduct.”). 
 163. See Rabe-Hemp & Braithwaite, supra note 162, at 141. 
 164. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 124 (expressing concern over the practice 
whereby a police office is caught committing PSV and is simply transferred to another jurisdiction). 
 165. See Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, https://www.d2l.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/all_statistics_20150619.pdf [https://perma.cc/86G2-Z4ST] (“Released rapists 
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RECOVERY 706 (Judy L. Postmus ed., 2013). (“Undetected rapists tend to be repeat offenders with one 
study reporting an average of more than five rapes for offenders who never were prosecuted by the 
criminal justice system.”). 
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system.”). 
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II. 
PSV, “BOYS WILL BE BOYS,” AND THE BLUE WALL 
As discussed above, some of the most challenging aspects of addressing 
PSV arise from how broadly PSV occurs and is tolerated, or at least ignored, by 
other police officers. PSV is not a problem of a few bad actors in the police.169 
Instead, it is symptomatic of a broader cultural problem of how sexual violence 
and sexual coercion are viewed by police officers. Any comprehensive account 
of PSV must address this cultural problem directly. 
One of the deepest running cultural tropes, reaching far beyond police 
officers, is the well-trod phrase “boys will be boys”—used to excuse all sorts of 
inappropriate and even criminal behavior.170 “Boys will be boys” is a harmful 
concept not simply because it excuses individual instances of bad behavior, but 
because it summarizes a belief that “boys are, by nature, disruptive, aggressive, 
unwise, and predatory.”171 This expression not only reinforces gender 
stereotypes (namely that men are masculine and aggressive) but also presumes 
that all men cannot control their destructive or aggressive behaviors.172 Such 
stereotypes are examined and helpfully explained by the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity. 
A. Hegemonic Masculinity 
The field of masculinities interrogates what expectations American society 
and law express about who men and boys are supposed to be. The field is 
generally labeled “masculinities” to indicate that there are different kinds of 
masculinity embodied by individual people.173 A key concept that directly 
challenges the myriad types of masculinities, however, is hegemonic 
masculinity: a single vision of masculinity that is seen as correct. This type of 
masculinity is described as the “ideal masculinity that has the most power at any 
 
 169. See Thomas Barker, Peer Group Support for Police Occupational Deviance, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY 353, 354 (1977) (finding “little support” for the “myth of the rotten apple”); Timothy M. 
Maher, Police Chiefs’ Views on Police Sexual Misconduct, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 239, 239–40 (2008) 
(describing the “‘bad apple’ theory of police corruption” as “subject to much criticism in recent years”).  
 170. See Megan Garber, Brett Kavanaugh and the Revealing Logic of ‘Boys Will Be Boys’, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/09/brett-
kavanaugh-and-the-revealing-logic-of-boys-will-be-boys/570415/ [https://perma.cc/XGK3-SJ9R]. 
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EVERYDAY FEMINISM (May 27, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com/2016/05/boys-will-be-boys-
harm/ [https://perma.cc/T2UQ-JA9Z]. 
 172. See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed: Perspectives on 
Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326, 336–37 (2013) (explaining that the phrase 
“boys will be boys” excuses a man’s excessively aggressive or destructive behaviors based on their 
biology rather than their social constructs and surroundings) [hereinafter McGinley & Cooper, Identities 
Cubed]. 
 173. See Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards A New Framework 
for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 431, 441 (2010); John M. Kang, 
The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 477, 495–507 (2010). 
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given time and place.”174 Hegemonic masculinity places itself firmly on top of a 
hierarchy, establishing the best and arguably only way to truly be a man.175 As 
Ann McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper—two of the leading scholars in legal 
masculinities—have summarized, even though “the hegemony of men” 
acknowledges that on the whole American society is patriarchal, hegemonic 
masculinity recognizes the simultaneous “harm that socially constructed 
masculinity does to men.”176 
As implied by hegemonic masculinity’s characterization as the only one 
way to be a man, its definition is extremely narrow. Hegemonic masculinity 
“focuses on competition, aggression, independence, control, and capacity for 
violence.”177 Because masculinity is also intersectional, hegemonic masculinity 
usually describes “the upper middle class [W]hite male professional who 
represents the ideal version of masculinity because of the important relationship 
between masculinity and breadwinning.”178 Hegemonic masculinity is thus 
raced, classed, and heteronormative as well as gendered. 
This specific form of hegemonic masculinity obviously leaves out the 
majority of men. Additionally, hegemonic masculinity is fundamentally 
unstable: it is not a status, but a very temporary result of a successful 
performance of masculinity.179 Cooper describes hegemonic masculinity as both 
homosocial, meaning that the performances are for the benefit of other men, and 
anxious “that other men will unmask them as insufficiently manly.”180 
Because of the pressure of attaining and re-attaining the narrow definition 
of hegemonic masculinity, as well as the intersectional dimensions that place 
many men further away from satisfying hegemonic masculinity’s narrow 
strictures, many men feel as though reaching hegemonic masculinity is an 
impossible task.181 To prove their masculinity, these men tend to act in more 
physical, hypermasculine ways.182 
Hypermasculinity is thus overcompensation. Denied the status of 
hegemonic masculinity for one reason, a man engages in hypermasculine 
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performance to try to make up the difference.183 Engaging in hypermasculine 
performance is, as Cooper put it, “an attempt to regain social status.”184 
Hypermasculine performances often depend upon asserting one’s dominance 
over people seen as “lesser” according to the strictures of hegemonic 
masculinity.185 Such performances include bragging about the sexual conquest 
of women and using physical aggression against people seen as weaker.186 
Violence can be a key part of hypermasculine performances, particularly against 
people seen as potential threats to one’s masculinity.187 Performances of 
hypermasculinity in attempts to impress or intimidate other men thus become 
part of the competition of hegemonic masculinity.188 
B. Police Culture and Masculinities 
Many of the more negative aspects of police culture are an example of such 
hypermasculine performances. In one of the foundational articles analyzing the 
police through a masculinities lens, Angela Harris contrasted the 
hypermasculinity of police with that of violent criminals: 
The cultural image of a police officer is a uniquely valuable and rare 
kind of man: tough and violent, yet heroic, protective, and necessary to 
society’s very survival. In a sense, the police officer is expected to be 
the mirror image of the paradigmatic criminal, the violent thug who 
threatens the lives and safety of innocent citizens. Criminals use 
violence in the service of evil; cops use violence to overcome evil.189 
Police officers thus engage in the violence of hypermasculinity, but in a 
socially (and legally) acceptable way, justifying it as protection rather than 
danger. The job depends upon physical achievements and trust between police 
officers, “especially when they are in the wrong.”190 
Police officers also come from communities that may be more likely to feel 
the need to engage in hypermasculine performances. One reason that a man fails 
to reach the top status of hegemonic masculinity is that he is not of sufficiently 
high socioeconomic class.191 Although being a police officer is itself a status 
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boost of masculinity, the ranks of police officers disproportionately draw from 
lower socioeconomic statuses and the occupation of police officer is often 
considered a blue collar job.192 The employment base of the police is thus 
dominated by men who are most likely to feel that they must engage in 
hypermasculinity to assert their status. 
Although police departments have increased the number of women officers 
in recent decades, they are still dominated by men.193 Police department cultures 
have problematic attitudes toward women that are consistent with hegemonic 
masculinity.194 Police departments have faced repeated issues with sexual 
harassment of female police officers by their coworkers195 as well as domestic 
violence committed against girlfriends and wives at home.196 The culture of 
police training uses female students in police academies as foils to define even 
more clearly in-groups of men and out-groups of everyone else.197 Police officers 
are also more likely than members of the public to believe problematic 
stereotypes about female victims of sexual assault. As Cory Rayburn Yung has 
detailed, “seventy-nine percent agree that ‘many women secretly wish to be 
raped’ and sixty-five percent agree that women with ‘bad reputations’ make the 
most rape complaints.”198 
Police officers and police departments then build a culture of support and 
silence on top of a foundation of hegemonic masculinity and hypermasculine 
performance. Scholars have described police departments as “closed groups” 
that develop their own unwritten rules of behavior.199 One of the most infamous 
examples is the notorious “blue wall of silence.”200 The blue wall is an unwritten 
police code of silence that demands that police officers remain silent or even 
affirmatively lie to conceal misconduct by a fellow officer.201 The blue wall, 
which “spawns a strong loyalty on the part of police officers to each other,”202 is 
believed to have developed as a result of the danger and hierarchical authority to 
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which police officers are subjected. 203 Police officers face very serious physical 
danger in the line of duty, and trust between fellow officers takes on greater 
significance (and greater consequences) than almost any other coworking 
relationship.  
William Westley’s famous research published in the 1950s describes how 
secrecy “functions as a social bond among the police, by giving them something 
in common (if only a sense of mutual incrimination).”204 Additionally, police 
officers operate within a system of clearly delineated ranks, and obeying orders 
issued by higher ranking officers is a similarly essential component of 
maintaining safety amidst potentially dangerous activities. It is thus unsurprising 
that police officers develop such strong loyalties to fellow officers.205 Scholars 
note that the blue wall may also be a result of pressures on police officers from 
the public and the media not only to provide protection to the community but 
also to remain honest and trustworthy.206 
While loyalty to one’s coworkers is obviously not in and of itself corrupt, 
the nature of police work creates a unique type of group loyalty whereby police 
officers are mandated to maintain their allegiance even to corrupt police 
officers.207 This unwavering commitment to loyalty has harsh consequences. 
Police officers that breach the blue wall may be “ostracized and harassed[,] 
become targets of complaints and even physical threats[,] and are made to fear 
that they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis.”208 Fearing these 
consequences, police officers tend to overlook peer misconduct or even lie about 
it.209 Even a generally honest police officer may feel pressured to maintain 
silence “in the face of another’s misconduct.”210 Some police officers have 
indicated that they are more reluctant to report a police officer than a regular 
citizen because they “do not want to be responsible for getting a fellow cop in 
trouble.”211 Therefore, especially in cases alleging use of excessive force or 
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police brutality, police officers often come together to either conceal or justify a 
fellow officer’s wrongful conduct.212 
Additionally, the close bonds between police officers reinforce the 
vulnerability that can trigger hypermasculine performances. Two central 
commandments of hegemonic masculinity are not to be a woman and not to be 
gay.213 The close relationships between police officers, both emotional and 
physical, could easily be viewed as becoming romantic or even sexual.214 The 
trust and reliance among male police officers thus pushes them towards a 
perceived need to counter implications of being gay with hypermasculinity. 
The blue wall also contributes to a relativist moral code that does not 
perceive incidents of PSV as morally wrong. In September 2008, researcher and 
former police officer Timothy Maher interviewed police chiefs in fourteen 
different police agencies located in the St. Louis metropolitan area about their 
perceptions regarding the nature, extent, and causes of PSV.215 Maher 
determined that four factors were particularly influential in allowing PSV: police 
culture, police departments’ policies addressing PSV, opportunity for sexual 
violence, and lack of knowledge about PSV.216 Maher concluded that police 
culture, including the blue wall, creates an atmosphere of ethical relativism.217 
Ethical relativism is a theory that suggests that morality is determined by 
“cultural traditions and socialization” rather than objective moral truths.218 In 
other words, one determines what is ethical and moral based on their social and 
cultural surroundings.219 Police officers thus create an understanding of morality 
and ethics as determined by police culture, which has deep roots in hegemonic 
masculinity. 
The blue wall theory helps explain why some police officers conclude that 
PSV is not a moral or ethical failing that is worthy of attention. Maher’s research 
concluded that 36.5 percent of police officers in the study have committed some 
form of PSV.220 This finding is staggering. It contradicts any notion that PSV is 
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committed by a few bad actors and demonstrates not only the severity and 
widespread nature of PSV but also that police officers fail to grasp how 
widespread the offense is.221 The prevalence of PSV coupled with the theory of 
ethical relativism suggests that PSV is a behavior police officers have simply 
been conditioned to accept.222 
The blue wall coupled with the theory of ethical relativism allows police 
departments to keep PSV under wraps. During Maher’s study, one officer 
reportedly stated, “Everybody knows [PSM] goes on, but nobody makes a big 
deal. Not until some citizen reports it, or the media gets a hold of it will PSM 
become a hot issue.”223 
Moreover, hegemonic masculinity helps explain why police officers often 
target people in the criminalized margins of society.224 Police officers looking to 
establish their masculinity will assert dominance over individuals lower in the 
identity hierarchy or individuals who are particularly vulnerable to the criminal 
justice system.225 Victims of PSV often include drug addicts, sex workers, 
LGBTQ+ people, and—disproportionately so—women of color.226 Notably, all 
of these groups occupy a lower level on the identity hierarchy of hegemonic 
masculinity than a police officer does.227 Unsurprisingly then, hypermasculine 
police officers are more likely to sexually assault members of these vulnerable 
groups in order to assert their dominance and establish their masculinity.228 
Finally, hegemonic masculinity helps explain the fraught relationship that 
police officers often have with the community in which they serve. Many 
scholars have written about the epidemic of police violence against Black men 
and communities, a phenomenon Devon Carbado has called “blue-on-[B]lack 
violence.”229 Although some of the cause certainly traces back to white 
supremacy, masculinity, and a broader sense of “us versus them” also contribute. 
Ann McGinley described police killings of Black men, largely by White officers, 
as gendered violence. As she describes it, hypermasculine police officers must 
dominate civilians in their patrol areas, and violence inflicted on those civilians 
is one of the most effective ways to achieve that masculine dominance.230 
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Cooper has a specific term for individual conflicts between a police officer 
and a member of the public: masculinity contests. A masculinity contest begins 
with Cooper’s concept of the “command presence” of police officers projecting 
an “aura of confidence.”231 The flip side of the command presence of police 
officers is the expectation that civilians defer to police officers, showing respect 
for their greater authority.232 A masculinity contest, just as it sounds, is when two 
men attempt to assert their masculine power over the other, each attempting to 
prove his greater masculine status.233 In interactions between police and 
members of the public, masculinity contests can arise when a police officer 
deploys his command presence for no reason or if a member of the public does 
not show what the police officer considers to be appropriate deference.234 
Cooper argued that stop-and-frisk interactions, known as Terry stops, are 
opportunities for police officers to stage and win a masculinity contest as they 
deploy both individual and institutional power to demand obedience from a 
civilian.235 A recent article echoed Cooper’s argument, revisiting the impact of 
Terry stops in the era of #MeToo and examining the often sexualized nature of 
frisks.236 Cooper has also written of the peril of a masculinity challenge when 
one’s masculinity is threatened by a specific challenge or an inability to 
adequately perform masculinity.237 Cooper argued that masculinity challenges 
can be sparked by compensatory subordination: a man who lacks status in one 
characteristic finds another characteristic through which he can engage in a 
masculinity contest to prove his superiority. This may occur, for example, when 
a police officer with low socioeconomic status uses the power of his employment 
to dominate another man.238 
Importantly, Cooper’s reading of interactions between police officers and 
the public implies how and why police officers could inflict PSV as a masculinity 
contest. One implication has to do with the dominance of the individual victim, 
a masculinity contest won through sexual conquest. Moreover, if the unwritten 
rule of civilian interactions with police is that the civilian must defer to the police 
officer, then this unwritten rule underscores that any purported expressed consent 
granted by a member of the public could not be meaningful consent. 
A broader implication, however, concerns the larger community. A 
successful hegemonic man accrues possessions—as Cooper puts it, “The indicia 
of manhood—money, power, women, and so on—are scarce resources; you can 
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always have more, and they gain their value from the fact that other men are 
denied them.”239 In masculinity contests between police officers and male 
members of the public, female members of the public are possessions that shift 
the balance of power in a police officer’s favor if he takes them. In other words, 
the sexual domination of women in a community also becomes a mechanism of 
expressing masculine dominance over the men of that community. This is 
obviously a deeply problematic calculus but one that fits perfectly within the 
worldview of hegemonic masculinity. 
Masculinities helps to deepen and explain what otherwise seems like 
inexplicable behavior by police officers who devote their lives to serving the 
public. Police officers are steeped in an environment of hegemonic masculinity, 
coding their job as essentially masculine and glorifying methods by which police 
officers demonstrate power over members of the public. Police officers therefore 
learn to engage in hypermasculine performances such as exerting sexual 
dominance and bragging about PSV behavior to their coworkers.240 Even if 
police officers inform their coworkers of this wrongful behavior, offending 
officers are rarely reprimanded because of ethical relativism and the blue wall. 
The officers’ coworkers are conditioned to feel apathetic towards the wrongful 
behavior, and the blue wall dissuades them from reporting it, even if coworkers 
understand the severity of the behavior.241 Thus, the blue wall protects offending 
officers despite their egregious conduct. Police culture perfectly embodies a 
“boys will be boys” attitude, giving male officers a pass to sexually assault 
women (and other minority groups) without facing any consequences.242 The 
structure of hegemonic masculinity both makes such violence more likely and 
prevents police departments from meaningfully addressing it. 
III. 
A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM DEMANDS SYSTEMIC REFORM 
Despite statistics indicating that a police officer engages in PSV every five 
days,243 PSV remains a deeply systemic problem that is underreported, under-
researched, and underdiscussed. Remaining silent about conduct that both 
jeopardizes the integrity of the criminal justice system and endangers women 
undermines the work of sexual assault advocates around the world. Therefore, in 
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an effort to expand sexual assault awareness through movements like #MeToo, 
PSV must be included in the dialogue surrounding sexual assault. 
Simultaneously, PSV should be incorporated into broader discussions of police 
brutality as it is one form of violence inflicted on both individuals and entire 
communities. 
As other scholars have argued, a necessary preliminary step in addressing 
PSV is developing a uniform definition of PSV.244 A uniform definition of PSV 
would provide a clear legal standard for courts and law enforcement and would 
appropriately label the term for the general public.245 For example, in 1979, 
Catharine MacKinnon formally defined workplace harassment as “sexual 
harassment.”246 Once the legal term was defined, capturing what had otherwise 
seemed like a broad and varied problem, awareness of the problem 
skyrocketed.247 In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act248 
after stakeholders began defining and raising awareness of sexual misconduct 
between corrections officers and inmates.249 Most recently, in 2016, Alexandra 
Brodsky coined the term “stealthing,” a form of sexual assault whereby a man 
takes off his condom without his partner’s consent. Once stealthing was openly 
discussed, victims recognized the sense of betrayal they harbored was 
warranted.250 These examples illustrate that “unity in problem formulation has 
the potential to mobilize entire movements.”251 
Therefore, to ensure accountability and raise awareness about PSV, a 
uniform definition of PSV must be adopted.252 Defining PSV will assist the 
public in conceptualizing the behavior and will also set precise boundaries for 
police officers and administrators.253 Until the behavior is specifically and 
uniformly defined, statistics will not be entirely accurate and awareness of the 
problem will be limited to those who actively research PSV. A uniform definition 
of PSV will help mobilize a movement that should have begun years ago.254 
Merely defining the offense, however, is not enough. PSV is a problem 
emerging from deep roots embedded in police policies and culture. A systemic 
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response is necessary to address the effects, the concealment, and the cultural 
roots of PSV. 
A. The Substance of PSV: Custody and Consent 
About thirty states do not currently have laws prohibiting police officers 
from having “consensual” sex with people in their custody.255 This is an 
unacceptable lapse in regulation: it should be legally impossible for a civilian in 
custody to consent to sexual contact with a police officer. Establishing a bright-
line rule forbidding sexual contact between a police officer on duty and a 
member of the public must be the first step in addressing PSV. 
As an initial matter, it is important to discuss the use of the concept of 
custody. As discussed above, state statutes that prohibit PSV generally prohibit 
sexual contact between a police officer and a person in police custody. In theory, 
“in custody” does not mean that a person has actually been arrested or formally 
taken into custody. In Miranda v. Arizona,256 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that a person is considered “in custody” not only when they are 
physically taken into custody, but also if they are otherwise deprived of freedom 
of action in any significant way.257  
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has held that a person is 
not in custody for Miranda purposes even in contexts where most people would 
not feel free to leave. For example, the Court has held that routine traffic stops 
do not require a Miranda warning.258 This is true even though, as the Court 
acknowledged, most states make it a crime to refuse to stop upon a police 
officer’s signal or, once stopped, to drive away before the police officer gives 
permission.259 The Court reasoned that, in contrast to being individually pulled 
over, a routine traffic stop is more akin to a Terry stop, in which a police officer 
briefly detains a person who the officer has reasonable suspicion is involved in 
the commission of a crime.260 The Court described both stops as “comparatively 
nonthreatening . . . detentions,” that did not constitute a person being in custody 
for the purpose of a Miranda warning.261 
This Miranda analysis intersects with a related question under the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment 
requires reasonable suspicion before a person may be seized and searched.262 
Even without reasonable suspicion, however, the police are free to search a 
person if the person voluntarily consents. In assessing whether a person 
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voluntarily consented to a search or whether the person had already been seized 
by the police, the Court posed a similar question: would a reasonable person have 
felt free to “terminate the encounter” with the police?263 If so, then they were not 
seized and could have told the officer not to search them.   
This raises two dilemmas in the context of PSV. The first returns to the idea 
of consent. If a police officer asks to search a person, the voluntariness of that 
consent is evaluated by considering the totality of the circumstances.264 Consent 
may be valid even if the person later says they did not know they could refuse265 
or had already been arrested.266 
One parallel question in the context of PSV is: if a person can consent to a 
search by the police, shouldn’t a person also be able to consent to sexual activity 
with the police? The answer is no, not only for the reasons discussed earlier 
focusing on the validity of an individual’s consent, but also from the perspective 
of the police. The search of a member of the public furthers “the effective 
enforcement of criminal laws.”267 Evaluating how protective the Constitution 
requires police to be of a civilian’s choice to consent to a search thus balances 
an individual’s liberty rights against the whole community’s security.268 
By contrast, civil consent to a sexual encounter with a police officer has no 
such value. There are almost no circumstances in which police sexual 
interactions with civilians are necessary (or even relevant) for a valid law 
enforcement purpose.269 A police search of a suspect furthers the core goals of 
law enforcement so courts have found an acceptable margin of error allowing 
the search even where the civilian claims their consent was not voluntary. 
Without any purpose but the sexual gratification of the police officer, there is no 
reason why any margin of error should be tolerated. 
This reasoning illuminates the second dilemma: do current statutes 
focusing on custody go far enough? It is obvious why a person in custody cannot 
consent to sexual acts with a police officer. Given that, by definition, a person 
“in custody” feels they are not at liberty to even terminate their conversation with 
the police officer, purportedly consenting to sexual activities with that same 
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police officer is entirely implausible.270 The bare minimum, therefore, is that a 
uniform definition of PSV in all fifty states must incorporate the substantive rule 
that a person in police custody is incapable of consenting to sexual activity with 
a police officer.  New York’s statute, passed in the wake of the Anna Chambers 
incident, is a good example of such a law: 
A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is: . . . (j) 
detained or otherwise in the custody of a police officer, peace officer, or 
other law enforcement official and the actor is a police officer, peace 
officer or other law enforcement official who either: (i) is detaining or 
maintaining custody of such person; or (ii) knows, or reasonably should 
know, that at the time of the offense, such person was detained or in 
custody.271 
Even this rule, however, would not reach conduct such as Holtzclaw’s 
sexual assault of a seventeen-year-old girl after driving her home.272 Andrea 
Ritchie proposed a much broader rule prohibiting sexual activity while a police 
officer is on duty, using a police vehicle, or at a state facility.273 Colorado’s 
statute takes a similarly broad perspective in its statute defining unlawful sexual 
conduct by a peace officer: 
(1) A peace officer commits unlawful sexual conduct by a peace officer 
by knowingly engaging in sexual contact, sexual intrusion, or sexual 
penetration under any of the following circumstances: 
(a) In the same encounter, the peace officer contacts the victim for 
the purpose of law enforcement or contacts the victim in the 
exercise of the officer's employment activities or duties; 
(b) The peace officer knows that the victim is, or causes the victim 
to believe that he or she is, the subject of an active investigation, 
and the peace officer uses that knowledge to further the sexual 
contact, intrusion, or penetration; or 
(c) In furtherance of sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration, the 
peace officer makes any show of real or apparent authority.274 
This Article focused on sexual contact with a person in custody because the 
legislative gap seems so obviously deficient, particularly in contrast with formal 
prohibitions of sexual contact between corrections officers and people in prison. 
It is our opinion, however, that the broader approach, used by Colorado and 
proposed by Andrea Ritchie, focusing on use of a police officer’s authority is a 
better approach. As discussed above, there is no legitimate reason why a police 
officer would use the power of their badge to engage in sexual contact with a 
member of the public. A clear prohibition of such coercion would be ideal, while 
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the more common approach of prohibiting sexual contact with individuals in 
custody would be a second-best option. 
B. Formalities of Fighting PSV 
A clear external rule will often not be enough to tackle PSV. In addition to 
the uniform substantive rule, clearer formal procedures should implement the 
rule within police departments and the larger community.275 Scholars indicate 
that police administrators play a crucial role in modifying police officer 
behavior.276 External rules of liability, even criminal liability, will not be enough. 
Given the “apparent availability of opportunities for misconduct provided by 
police work,” police administrators are in a unique position to proactively control 
PSV.277 Furthermore, because of the ethical relativism operating within police 
departments, administrators must condition officers to recognize the 
dangerousness and severity of PSV.278 
In order to most effectively dismantle PSV from the inside, administrators 
“should be educated and trained about sexual [violence] and its effects on 
policing.”279 Understanding some of the likely reasons PSV is prominent will 
allow police department administrators to create more effective policies 
grounded in research. Additionally, knowledge about PSV will allow police 
department administrators to communicate and emphasize that all PSV is 
problematic, not just the most severe forms.280 Finally, police department 
administrators are in the best position to advocate for the integrity of the criminal 
justice system, which is strongly undermined by PSV.281 Once “the secrecy 
surrounding PSM is removed, and police administrators, supervisors, and 
officers take this problem seriously, it is likely that the true extent of PSM will 
be discovered and legitimate efforts can be made to control it.”282 Until then, 
however, the blue wall will continue protecting offending officers who abuse 
their authority by preying on the most vulnerable. 
A key component of this administrative change is the need for police 
departments to adopt written policies defining and prohibiting PSV. The lack of 
written policies addressing PSV “may suggest that police officials believe that 
PSM is not a significant problem and therefore is not worthy of a policy.”283 
Implementing formal policies addressing PSV may be instrumental in 
dismantling this behavior within police departments. At minimum, specific, 
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formal policies can clearly define what is expected of police officers and what is 
considered inappropriate conduct. Internal guidance from within the department 
will directly combat the ethical relativist perception that PSV is acceptable (or at 
least not worth reporting).284 In this way, police department policies can serve 
an expressive function: detailing explicit expectations which may serve both “to 
provide a voice in which citizens may speak and alter the behavior of people the 
[policies] address.”285 Policies addressing PSV would therefore “send a message 
to police officers and the public that this behavior is not condoned or 
tolerated.”286 Written policies addressing PSV may be a crucial tool for 
controlling police behavior,287 which is crucial given the severity and prevalence 
of PSV and the strength of the blue wall. 
Research into other examples of police misconduct further substantiates the 
effectiveness of written policies. The Use of Force Project conducted research 
on police departments with “use of force” policies, investigating whether there 
was a relationship between use of force policies and the prevalence of police 
killings.288 Their research revealed that police departments with use of force 
policies had fewer killings per population and per arrest than those without.289 
The advocates determined that “a police department with no . . . policies 
currently in place would have 72 [percent] fewer killings by implementing all . . . 
of these policies.”290 The advocates concluded their research by stating: 
This [research] suggests that advocacy efforts pushing police 
department[s] to adopt more restrictive use of force policies—and the 
accountability structures to enforce them—can substantially reduce the 
number of people killed by police in America. And while this analysis 
was limited to examining rates of deadly force, these policies may also 
be associated with reductions in other forms of police violence as 
well.291 
Although the Use of Force Project relates only to use of deadly force, the 
research suggests that police department policies can be highly influential in 
controlling police behavior.292 Accordingly, all police departments in the United 
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States should create and enforce policies addressing PSV to reduce the amount 
of people assaulted by police. To be most effective, the policies must expressly 
prohibit the “officer shuffle.” Without a stipulation in the policies prohibiting the 
“officer shuffle,” the policies will be lackluster and police officers will not take 
them seriously.293 
Additionally, states and police departments should establish a clear method 
for members of the public to report misconduct by police, including PSV. Every 
state should institute a civilian complaint department similar to New York’s 
Civilian Complaint Review Board. PSV victims are typically fearful of 
retaliation by the assaulting officer and often do not know where to report police 
misconduct. Creating a civilian complaint department where civilians can press 
charges against officers will alleviate that fear and ensure that victims do not 
suffer in silence simply because they are unsure of where to report. Creating and 
enforcing written policies addressing PSV will set a standard of intolerance of 
PSV within police departments which may in turn reduce the occurrence of PSV. 
Additionally, establishing separate entities to review and address PSV cases (and 
other forms of police violence) will ensure that police conduct is reviewed and 
that police authority is not abused. Thus, creating a separate entity to take care 
of police officer complaints will ensure that police officers and police 
departments are not “[l]eft unchecked.”294 
C. Fighting the Culture of PSV 
Substantive and procedural changes within the law and police departments, 
however, are not enough. PSV is symptomatic of a broader cultural problem 
combining police brutality, hegemonic masculinity, and broader tensions 
implicating race, class, and other identities. Any attempt to meaningfully combat 
PSV must take these deeper roots into account. 
1. Call It What It Is: PSV Is a Form of Police Brutality 
If police brutality can take the form of sexual abuse, do our laws, police 
department policies, and media carve out a conceptual difference between 
traditional police brutality and PSV? It is unquestionably a good thing that public 
awareness of police brutality has risen in recent years. It is problematic, however, 
that the bulk of the attention has focused on police killings of Black men by 
White officers, overlooking other forms of violence.295 
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PSV is also a form of police brutality and should be included in any 
discussion addressing police violence against the public. Categorizing PSV and 
police brutality separately perpetuates the notion that sexual assault of women 
of color and LGBTQ+ people by police officers is a less important problem than 
police violence against Black or African American men. By characterizing PSV 
differently than police brutality, the media, police departments, and legislatures 
“fail to understand sexual assault as structural violence that courts have not 
adequately protected against and the sinister history of policing and incarceration 
in this country.”296 In order to acknowledge the extent of PSV and the dangers it 
poses to victims, law enforcement, and the integrity of the criminal justice 
system, dialogue about PSV must be reframed to capture that PSV is a subset of 
police brutality. Until the law, police departments, and the media recognize this, 
women—specifically women of color—will continue to be treated as second-
class citizens. Therefore, “[o]nly by inserting discussion of [PSV] into the 
dominant discourse surrounding police violence can we hope to eliminate the 
problem.”297 Furthermore, this inclusion will enrich the broader discussion of 
police violence. We cannot fully grasp the problem of police brutality without 
acknowledging all forms of police brutality. 
2. Acknowledge PSV’s Intersectionality 
Any discussion of PSV must expressly acknowledge the intersectional 
nature of the violence and victimology. Famously coined by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw,298 intersectionality recognizes multiple roots of oppression and 
discrimination that can operate simultaneously against a single person. In the 
Holtzclaw case, he almost exclusively targeted women of color who came from 
low socioeconomic backgrounds and had criminal histories. Each of those 
characteristics made them more vulnerable to his assault. The confluence of 
several characteristics meant that Holtzclaw identified his victims as unlikely to 
meaningfully fight back or report his crimes. As Devon Carbado described 
Holtzclaw’s victimology: 
The women whom Holtzclaw assaulted were bargaining in the shadow 
of their vulnerability and his power. That vulnerability and power 
derived from the presumptive legitimacy of police conduct, the 
invisibility of sexual assault as a form of police violence, the historical 
sexual inviolability of [B]lack women, and that these women were 
unlikely icons of victimization around whom the public at large or the 
[B]lack community specifically would organize.299 
Just as PSV should be included in any discussion of police brutality, it 
should also be incorporated into any discussion of #MeToo and sexual violence. 
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It is particularly important, however, to acknowledge the profoundly 
intersectional victimology of PSV, especially when contrasted to high profile 
examples of assault that dominate headlines about #MeToo, often involving 
affluent White women. Just as the picture of police brutality should be expanded 
beyond White officers killing Black men, the picture of sexual oppression should 
be expanded beyond White men assaulting White women. 
3. Changing Police Culture 
Finally, any discussion of PSV must address and combat police culture’s 
hegemonic masculinity. One solution proposed by scholars such as Nancy Leong 
is a simple one: encourage police departments to recruit more female officers. 
Leong argues this would reduce incidents of excessive force against members of 
the public.300 At first blush, this may seem like a simplistic approach, but 
diversifying the police force helps disrupt at least some of the dominant 
messages and implicit cultural norms among police officers.301 Notably, any 
such efforts cannot simply emphasize gender neutrality in hiring. Rather, as 
Valorie Vojdik has advocated, any attempt to make police departments more 
gender-diverse should examine the causes of predominantly male police forces 
and address all of those causes, including both explicit policies and implicit 
norms.302 
Second, discussions of police culture and interactions with the public, 
regardless of their gender, should take masculinities into account. “Boys will be 
boys” is a frequent phrase employed in discussions of misbehavior by the public 
and has garnered at least some public criticism. “Men will be men,” however, is 
a very different statement, and discussions of the role manliness and masculinity 
play in police brutality has been insufficiently incorporated into public 
discussion. 
Third, policy-makers should ask what measures might disrupt operation of 
hegemonic masculinity within police departments. One intriguing and 
counterintuitive possibility is to raise the social status of police officers by 
increasing their salaries. Although this may seem like an odd response to an issue 
of police misconduct, Monica Bell identified the low wages of police officers as 
one reason poor communities are deprived of meaningful protection and feel 
legal estrangement from the police.303 Professor Bell’s argument that poor 
communities would more likely receive the benefits of police protection if police 
wages reflected their value in the community also extends to PSV. Masculinities 
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buttresses this argument further, as raising the socioeconomic status of police 
officers could reduce the perceived need to raise one’s status through 
hypermasculine performance. 
Finally, the role of the blue wall in police departments’ masculine culture 
must be addressed. Because of the blue wall, offending police officers are often 
protected from any consequences. Even police officers who do not condone PSV 
are nonetheless silent about the issue in the name of loyalty to the brotherhood.304 
Accordingly, the blue wall perpetuates the idea that police officers can sexually 
assault vulnerable people without fear of expulsion from the police force. The 
only way to eliminate the problem is to reduce the effectiveness and protection 
of the blue wall. While the blue wall has existed for centuries and undermining 
its force will be extremely difficult, the only people who can dismantle the force 
of the blue wall are those whose interests it protects: police officials and 
administrators. 
CONCLUSION 
PSV is a deeply rooted problem with shocking prevalence across the 
country. Combating PSV will require meaningful legal and cultural changes to 
police departments. With a series of targeted reforms, however, such significant 
change is possible. Police departments and legislatures should create, adopt, and 
advocate for a uniform definition of PSV. Such a definition will help the public 
conceptualize the violence and understand the gravity of the problem. This 
uniform definition should establish that a person in police custody cannot 
consent to sexual activities with a police officer. Additionally, the media, police 
departments, and advocates should take measures to ensure PSV is categorized 
appropriately in the public eye, namely that PSV is a subset of police brutality 
that specifically targets vulnerable groups such as women, the LGBTQ+ 
community, socioeconomically disadvantaged people, and other marginalized 
demographics. This targeting happens as a result of a troubling trend towards 
privileging hegemonic masculinity within police culture.  
Finally, because PSV appears to be, at least in large part, a result of the 
police atmosphere promulgated by ideas of hegemonic masculinity and 
unwavering loyalty, police administrators are in the best position to condemn 
PSV. To begin that movement, every police department across the nation should 
create and enforce policies specifically addressing PSV. These policies must 
specifically include a prohibition against the “officer shuffle,” as a policy 
without an explicit prohibition will not adequately protect vulnerable people 
from PSV. Until these measures are taken, underreporting of PSV and incredibly 
rare individual proceedings will continue to be too little and too late.  
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